The usefulness of a Happy Income Index by Prinz, Aloys & Bünger, Björn
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Prinz, Aloys; Bünger, Björn
Working Paper
The usefulness of a Happy Income
Index
CAWM discussion paper / Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung Münster, No. 15
Provided in cooperation with:
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster (WWU)
Suggested citation: Prinz, Aloys; Bünger, Björn (2011) : The usefulness of a Happy Income









CAWM –Discussion Paper No 15  
 
April 2011 
(revised version of “Living in a material world: Happy Income and Happy Life Years”) 
 
 
Presented at the OECD Conference “New Directions in Welfare II”  






2 and Björn Bünger 
Institute of Public Economics 
Center for Applied Economic Research Münster 





1 The authors are also grateful to Brian Bloch for his comprehensive editing of the manuscript. All remaining 
errors are, of course, ours. 
2 Corresponding author: Aloys Prinz, Wilmergasse 6-8, 48143 Münster, Germany. A.Prinz@wiwi.uni-




In this paper, Happy Income is introduced as an indicator of physical and socio-psychic well-
being. It is constructed on the assumption that socio-economic well-being is based on 
objective circumstances, such as personal income as well as on a subjective evaluation of life. 
In combining these factors, Happy Income is a cardinal measure of overall well-being in a 
given country. Therefore, Happy Income is not subject to the limitations of purely ordinally 
scaled indicators, i.e. it is not restricted by an upper bound, which may be one explanation of 
the Easterlin paradox. The Happy Income concept is employed to measure social well-being 
in various different European countries. The results are compared to these countries’ score on 
Ruut Veenhoven’s Happy Life Years. It is argued that Happy Income is a valuable 
complement to other indicators of well-being at an aggregated level.  
 
 
JEL-classification: I 10, I 31 
Keywords: Happiness research, Happy Income, Happy Life Years, Subjective Well-being   3
Introduction 
 
The relationship between happiness and income is one of the key issues in happiness 
economics (Easterlin, 2002; Bruni and Porta, 2007; Frey et al., 2008; Mentzakis and Moro, 
2009). Starting with Easterlin’s (1974) seminal paper, a large body of writing is devoted to 
this topic, including Diener and Oishi (2000), Easterlin (1995, 2001), Hagerty and Veenhoven 
(2003), as well as Stutzer (2004). In these studies, as in more recently published work by 
Caporale et al. (2009) and Becchetti and Rosetti (2009), not only the determining factors of 
individual happiness are considered, but also the degree of life satisfaction or happiness at the 
macro level of nations. 
 
One of the reasons to seek out useful and reliable indicators of a nation’s well-being is that 
such indicators could provide a guideline for policy-making, such as development policy 
(Goulet, 1992). Indeed, it seems that the search for indicators of ‘the wealth of nations’ (i.e., 
an economy’s material output), commenced as early as the sixteenth century and has never 
ceased. The question of how to measure social well-being – in contrast to material well-being 
alone - has been answered since the 1970s with the social indicators movement, which 
focused on heteronomous indicators, using a top-down approach. The indicators proposed 
were developed mainly by researchers in the social sciences, without active participation of 
the population as a whole. In the 1990s, research on happiness revolutionized the approach to 
finding out what social well-being means and how it can be measured, by asking people 
themselves how they are feeling.
3 Consequently, the resulting indicators may be considered as 
autonomous, being constructed in a bottom-up approach (Prinz, 2009). 
 
The traditional attempt to concentrate solely on material output in order to determine the well-
being of a society seems too narrow to grasp what makes living in a certain country 
worthwhile. On the other hand, the exclusive usage of subjective attitudes, as indicators of 
well-being at the macro-level, neglects the fact that human beings do indeed have material 
needs. Therefore, both material endowments and the psycho-social conditions of living (i.e., 
subjective satisfaction with life or happiness) determine the level of socio-economic well-
being in a society. 
 
                                                            
3 For an overview see e.g. Kahneman/Diener/Schwarz (1999).   4
Ruut Veenhoven’s index of Happy Life Years (HLY) is an initial attempt at combining 
material and non-material well-being. This index can be described as the transformation of 
ordinally scaled utility into a cardinally measurable form, by combining the life expectancy in 
a country and multiplying it with the average self-reported life satisfaction (Veenhoven, 
1996). This index, however, does not take into account the wealth of a country and, therefore 
cannot capture the effect of income growth.  
 
The present paper is intended as a contribution to the debate on the measurement of well-
being at a societal macro-level. We provide a theoretical justification for a new aggregate 
measure of well-being, which we call the Happy Income (HI) index. Furthermore, applying 
the HI index to data from the European Quality of life Survey (EQLS), we contribute to the 
empirical comparison of well-being among European nations. Since the HI index is related to 
the Veenhoven’s Happy Life Years (HLY) index, we also contribute to the debate on this 
indicator. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, ordinal scales are discussed as one 
possible cause of the Easterlin paradox. In the third section, Happy Income (HI) is introduced, 
justified and defined. In addition, empirical results for several European countries are 
presented. The fourth section contains a methodological and empirical comparison of Happy 
Income and Happy Life Years. The final section concludes. 
 
 
2 Index scales and the Easterlin paradox 
 
The least one can say is that the Easterlin paradox (Easterlin, 1974, 1995, 2005) – which 
states that economic growth does not necessarily improve the human lot, as measured by the 
average level of subjective well-being or ‘happiness’ in a society – tremendously stimulated 
both empirical and theoretical research into the measurement of a society’s well-being. The 
paradox has been criticized for the econometric methods applied (e.g., Boes and Winkelmann, 
2006), rejected empirically on the basis of recent data (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; 
D’Ambrosio and Frick, 2007; Hagerty and Veenhoven, 2003) and explained by a large 
number of authors. In particular, it is emphasized that relative income – in addition to absolute 
income – may play a crucial role for well-being (e.g., Caporale et al., 2009; Mentzakis and 
Moro, 2009; Clark et al., 2008; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).    5
 
However, we do not intend to discuss these results in detail here. Rather, we argue that the 
Easterlin paradox could be a consequence of measuring life satisfaction through a Likert 
scale, i.e., an ordinal scale with an upper bound, so that it cannot grow over time once the 
maximum value is attained. Moreover, in contrast to much of the existing literature on 
happiness, it is assumed here that the survey question on general life satisfaction is not an 
equivalent index to that of economic ‘utility’.
4 In this paper, we interpret the results of the life 
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The mapping in (1)
6 states that utility (measured as the level of life satisfaction) is reflected in 
the Likert scale of integer numbers INT(1,…, 10), as the level of psycho-social well-being a 
person i experiences at time t, ψi,t, under the condition that the average material life conditions 
(i.e., income) are given by yt. This contrasts with the standard interpretation of utility 
measurements via the life satisfaction question, by using a ten-point Likert scale which can be 
stated as follows: 
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In (2), life satisfaction is equivalent to utility and is measured by a ten-point integer number 
scale. 
 
In Figure 1, utility measured on an ordinal scale is depicted for three different points in time, t 
= 0, 1, 2. We assume that utility can indeed be measured on a cardinal scale. In contrast, the 
actual measurement is conducted with an ordinally scaled item. We introduce the average 
                                                            
4 See Becker and Rayo (2008), who also question the assumption that ‘happiness’, as measured by the answers to 
the question on the level of life satisfaction, is identical to ‘utility’ as defined in economic theory. For a similar 
position, see Kimball and Willis (2006). 
5 See Kristofferson (2010) for a comprehensive survey on the interpretations of data on subjective well-being, 
with particular respect to issues like cardinality, neutrality and additivity. 
6 In order to avoid confusion, the index i for individuals is omitted from the formulas for the remainder of the 
paper.   6
disposable income as a cardinal factor to reflect the economic situation of a particular society 
at a given time. 
 












Source: Own depiction. 
 
Firstly, consider a situation in which the average income remains unchanged over time. A 
personal evaluation of one’s satisfaction with life on a ten-point scale is depicted by the 
corridor between the ordinate and the vertical dashed bold line. This scale represents the 
ordinal utility level. Let us assume an individual is quite satisfied with his life and scores a 
“seven”, as depicted by the vertical dashed thin line. This corresponds to a utility of U(t = 0) 
in terms of the absolute (or cardinal) utility level. Over time, the individual remains equally 
content with his life (at t = 1 and t = 2, happiness is also “seven”) and, as can be seen on the 
abscissa, the utility remains constant (U(t = 0) = U(t = 1) = U(t = 2)).   7
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Source: Own depiction. 
 
Now consider a development where the average income increases as depicted in Figure 2. 
Here, the evaluation of life satisfaction is indicated by the corridor between the two tilted bold 
lines. Again, the individual is quite satisfied and remains so over time (a “seven” on a one-to-
ten happiness scale). Due to the rising income, this happiness corresponds to the utility U(t = 
0) in t = 0, but changes in the second and third periods. As can be seen by the downward 
arrows, the cardinal utility level increases over time, while the reported life satisfaction 
remains constant. 
 
For instance, the constant ordinal utility levels for t = 0 to t = 2 are compatible with a constant 
income over time, as well as with an increasing income level (the tilted case). However, as 
shown by the downward arrows in Figure 2 for U(t = 1) and U(t = 2), the absolute levels of 
utility may increase with increasing income, without being detected by the metric defined by 
(2). With a measure as defined by (2), it cannot be stated with certainty whether a constant   8
level of ordinal utility entails the same level of cardinal utility. The reason is the lack of an 
absolute comparative measure.  
 
Consequently, it comes as no surprise that economic growth does not evidently improve the 
human lot, as claimed by the Easterlin paradox. However, the paradox seems to more of an 
artefact of the measurement method than a correct description of the effects of economic 
growth on subjective well-being. In order to overcome the ordinal nature of utility 
measurement, we develop the Happy Income index below. 
 
 
3  Happy Income Index 
  3.1 Theoretical justification and definition 
 
The concept of “Happy Income”, as developed here, captures both material and psycho-social 
well-being. Moreover, its dimension is a monetary unit (e.g. Euro), so that Happy Income is a 
measure of satisfaction-weighted income. 
 
In order to develop a theoretical justification, we start with a utility function of the 
Lindenberg-type (1986) and assume that individual utility depends on material as well as 
psycho-social well-being. Moreover, assume that material well-being is defined by the 
availability of income (ϕ ), and psycho-social well-being by the disposability of those goods 
and services that cannot be bought by money (e.g., friends, love etc.) (ψ ). The individual 
utility function can generally be written as follows: 
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Note that in (3), the utility function already contains two arguments which are represented 
through the mapping of U onto a single utility level. Furthermore, the utility levels given by 
(3) have no upper ceiling; in contrast to (2), U is mapped in (3) onto the real numbers greater 
than zero. However, the functional form of the mapping in (3) is not yet defined. 
   9
For utility functions with more than one attribute, there are two crucial ways of specifying (3) 
in order to render them relatively easy to calculate, namely as an additive-separable utility 
function as in (4) and as a quasi-additive (multiplicative) utility function as in (5): 
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Note that additive-separable utility functions are called value independent (Pliskin et al., 
1980), because the respective levels of material well-being φ and psycho-social well-being ψ 
do not interact with each other with respect to the total level of utility. By contrast, the utility 
function defined by (5) exhibits the weaker mutually utility independence (Keeney and Raiffa, 
1993; Keeney, 1971, 1974). That is, if one factor is fixed and the other changed, the decision 
maker has an identical ordering of preferences, irrespective of the value at which the first 
factor is fixed.  
 
We suggest that material and psycho-social well-being are mutually utility-independent. 
Mathematically, this implies that the cross-derivatives of the utility function U(φ,ψ) do not 
exist. Nevertheless, the levels of material as well as psycho-social well-being do mutually 
influence each other, i.e. they are mutually utility-independent, but not value-independent. 
The higher the one level, the higher (c.p.) the total level of utility, and vice versa. In the 
following analysis, (5) is considered the most appropriate form of utility measurement. 
 
Moreover, we argue that material and psycho-social well-being are mutually necessary for 
well-being. Therefore, in (5), α and β are set equal to zero so that the utility function reads: 
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Note that the utility function in (6) implies value dependence for total utility, as well as for the 
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Having decided on the general functional form of the multiattributed utility function in (6), 
the remaining task is to specify the utility functions for material well-being, U(φ), and 
psycho-social well-being, U(ψ). In economics, (6) is often specified as: 
 
γ γ ψ ψ ϕ ϕ ψ ϕ
− − − =
1
0 0 ) ( ) ( ) , ( U          ( 8 )  
 
with 0 < γ < 1. This is a Stone-Geary utility function with  0 ϕ and  0 ψ as the required minimum 
levels of the respective goods. Note that the transformation of these goods into welfare levels 
entails a concave function. This transformation implies that all goods taken into account 
exhibit decreasing marginal welfare. The assumption of decreasing marginal welfare with 
respect to all components of welfare is quite common in international comparisons of well-
being, see, for instance, Becker et al. (2005), Fleurbaey and Gaulier (2007) and for an 
overview, Decancq et al. (2009). 
 
Material well-being, φ, seems to be measured best by income and, because human beings live 
together in households, disposable household income is a good indicator. However, since the 
size and composition of households differ, it is necessary to make the incomes comparable 
among households. The economic tool for doing so is the equivalence scale, which indicates 
how much more income households with several members need to gain a standard of living 
comparable to a single-person household earning a certain income. Dividing the household 
income by its equivalence scale number yields the equivalent household income. 
 
The question is whether these incomes should be transformed as indicated by (8), in order to 
obtain a utility index of material well-being. Note, however, that the transformation of the   11
household income to equivalent household incomes in virtually all equivalence scales 
involves a concave mapping of the raw income onto the equivalent income.
7 This is justified, 
as the income required to sustain the standard of living of a single-person household decreases 
with household size, due, for example, to economies of scale. Therefore, it might be argued 
that the transformation of incomes into equivalent incomes creates a utility measure of 
material well-being. Of course, one could also justify an additional transformation of the 
income as indicated by (8). However, it is suggested here that the equivalent household 
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The material well-being of an individual i in country j at time t is measured by the 
household’s equivalent income. For sake of simplicity, in (9), the minimum required material 
well-being in (8) (φ0) is not explicitly taken into consideration. Therefore, when comparing 
countries, one should select only those which are not constrained by φ0, i.e. countries in which 
the vast majority of citizens are not considered poor. 
 
Psycho-social well-being is measured next, in order to compare the well-being of nations. A 
generally accepted method is to ask people directly about their levels of life satisfaction. From 
the perspective of happiness research, these answers are a reliable and valid measure of so-
called eudaimonic happiness (Ryan and Deci, 2001). From a theoretical point of view, the 
measurement may be interpreted as the mapping H of a vector of objective psycho-social life 
circumstances  l1, l2, l3, …, ln of the household onto an integer number Int (1,…,10) that 
represents the level of positive subjective feelings: 
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In this context, the life circumstances (expressed in positive real numbers) are mapped onto an 
integer from one to ten. Consequently, H(l1, l2, l3, …, ln) may be interpreted as a measure of 
psycho-social well-being. Although Oswald (2008) argued that the curvature of the reporting 
                                                            
7 For example, in the scales used in publications of the OECD: the OECD equivalence scale, the OCED-
modified scale and the square root scale, see OECD (n.y.).   12
function  H(…) is not clearly defined, it is assumed here that the reported level of life 
satisfaction by an individual, H(…), is the best available measure of psycho-social well-being, 
that is: 
 
). ( ) ,..., , , ( 3 2 1 ψ U l l l l H n =           ( 1 1 )  
 
Note that (11) seems to suggest that psycho-social well-being is measured on an unrestricted 
ordinal scale of real numbers. This is not in fact the case, as can be seen by the definition of 
the H(…) function in (10). Hence, U(ψ) in (11) is still measured ordinally on a Likert scale. 
Nevertheless, the survey data on life satisfaction are interpreted as the level of psycho-social 
household well-being. As with the measure of material well-being, the minimum required 
level of psycho-social well-being is not considered explicitly here. 
 
The level of well-being in a society as a whole may be measured by: 
) (
1
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with 
j
t i EY ,  as the equivalent income of household i, i = 1, …, N, at time t in country j and 
j
t i H ,  
as the level of life satisfaction of that household.  
 
According to (12), the HI index is defined as the average level of the product of equivalent 
household income and individual life satisfaction. The latter is measured via a Likert scale 
and is therefore a unit-free measure. The equivalent income is the income of a household 
adjusted through an equivalence scale, so as to make households of different sizes and 
compositions comparable. Since the equivalent household income is measured in a monetary 
unit (e.g., Euro, US-Dollar), the HI index is denominated in monetary units. In order to render 
HI indices of different countries comparable, purchasing power parities (PPP) of the national 
currencies may be used to  represent of equivalent incomes. 
 
Relying on non-monetary indicators has the disadvantage that outcomes are not compatible 
with cost measurements which are ordinarily denoted in monetary terms. Since the 
measurement unit of HI is money, it can easily be used in cost-benefit analysis, e.g., for 
measuring and comparing the outcomes of public policy instruments. 
   13
From a practical perspective, there are two potential objections to the approach described by 
(12). Firstly, the answers to the question about life satisfaction may contain an evaluation of 
the household income. Hence, (12) could lead to double counting the effect of income on 
well-being. Of course, it seems difficult to argue that the answers to questions about life 
satisfaction are not influenced by household income. However, the answers do not seem to 
depend predominantly on income. Furthermore, life satisfaction is measured by an ordinal 
scale which cannot change, that is, it is restricted to integer values between 1 and 10. This is 
not compatible with the measurement of utility effects of growing incomes which require a 
utility measure without bounds. The HI index of (12) is thus a possible measurement. 
 
A second objection may be based on Veenhoven’s (2000) distinction of ‘four qualities of life’. 
It could be argued that HI inappropriately mixes two different things, namely chances in form 
of income, with outcomes in the form of happiness. First of all, both income and life 
satisfaction are outcomes, but from different processes. Income is the outcome of the material 
part of the ‘game of life’ which can be valuated separately from other aspects of life as 
formalized by equation (6). With this view, ‘happiness’ or more precisely, satisfaction with 
life, on the other hand, is the outcome of the psycho-social aspect of the ‘game of life’. Hence, 
both variables represent outcomes of different aspects of life.
8 
 
In short, there seem to be good reasons for measuring national well-being in monetary units, 
by summing the product of individual life satisfaction and equivalent income.  
 
 
3.2 Empirical results 
 
In this section, the concept of the HI is applied to different European countries. The selected 
member states of the European Union can be regarded as relatively wealthy, so that the 
omission of a minimum requirement for financial endowments seems justified.  
 
                                                            
8 Veenhoven’s HLY may also be interpreted as mixing chances (life years) with outcomes (happiness). It could 
be argued that life years are a necessary (but not sufficient) input in the ‘production’ of well-being, of which 
happiness (as the ‘appreciation of life’) is the ultimate outcome. In a similar manner, income is also a necessary 
(but not sufficient) input in the ‘production’ of happiness (outcome). Hence, from this perspective, there is no 
categorical difference between HLY and HI. 
   14
The data on happiness and income from the 2007 European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) 
are used in the following analysis. The EQLS is a micro-survey based on face-to-face 
interviews in 31 European countries and is conducted by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound).
9 The regular sample size in 
each country comprises 1,000 individuals. In France, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom 
1,500 individuals are interviewed and in Turkey and Germany, about 2,000 interviews are 
conducted (Eurofound 2009). The survey includes two items related to general subjective 
well-being: one question about life satisfaction and one about happiness. As both questions 
are ordinally scaled and constructed as 10-point Likert scales, where 1 is the lowest possible 
level (“very unhappy”/”very dissatisfied”) and 10 the highest possible (“very happy”/”very 
satisfied”), both are appropriate for the calculation of HI measures. The general-life-
satisfaction question was chosen to enable comparability with the concept of Happy Life 
Years, because it is more similar in phrasing to Veenhoven’s example of happiness questions 
(e. g., Veenhoven, 2004). 
 
Figure 3 shows the average life satisfaction (or happiness) for the EU 27 countries.
10
                                                            
9 In addition to the 27 member states of the European Union, the survey was carried out in three candidate states 
(Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey) and in Norway. For the present analysis, 
only the data for the twenty-seven member states are used.  
10 The descriptive statistics for the data are given in Table A1 in the appendix.   15 





























































































































































































































Source of data: EQLS 2007.  16
The income question in the EQLS first requests the exact net income (or an estimation) and if 
this question cannot be answered, a second question asks the respondent to give the range of 
household income (nineteen ranges are provided).
11 The values of the income variable are 
calculated by combining the answers to this twofold question.
12 To allow for differences in 
the purchasing power of income in the different countries, the income in monetary units is not 
used, but rather the purchasing power parity (PPP). To allow for the different household sizes 
and structures, equivalent incomes are used.
13 When only the income ranges are given, they 
are replaced by the arithmetic means of the ranges. For the highest (open-ended) range, its 
lower bound plus half the range of the second-highest income bracket is used. This amount of 
4724.50 Euro is the highest possible value attained with a single person answering this 
question (households with more members have a lower equivalent income, due to the 
equivalence operation). Monthly equivalent income is cut at this value, so as to correct for 
outliers, as values above and beyond can only be the result of the ‘precise’ income question. 
Especially in these income regions, the precision of and willingness to give correct answers is 
questionable. Finally, the values for monthly income are divided by 1,000 for convenience. 
The income component of the HI is presented in Figure 4 (and Table A2 in the appendix).  
 
                                                            
11 In this question, the income ranges are presented as weekly, monthly or annual.  
12 Eurofound (n. y.). 
13 In the EQLS survey, the modified OECD equivalence scale is used. This scale weights the first adult in a 
household as 1.0, any additional person 14 years and older as 0.5 and  any child 0.3, see Eurofound (2009) and 
OECD (n.y.).    17 
























































































































































































































Source of data: EQLS 2007.   18 




























































































































































































































Source of data: EQLS 2007.   19
The average values of the Happy Income indicator for 2007 are shown in Figure 5. Table 1 
shows the unweighted arithmetic mean and median, as well as the standard deviation of the 
Happy Income index for the European countries in 2007 and the number of observations on 
which the index is calculated. For example, the happiness-weighted income is 17.01 in 
Luxembourg, 10.39 in the United Kingdom, 9.59 in France and for Bulgaria, 2.08. The 
relative frequencies of the values for HI are shown in Figures A1a – c in the appendix. As 
expected for a measure containing income, all distributions are left-skewed, but there are 
some extreme cases where the lowest category is the mode (e.g. Bulgaria and Latvia).  
 
 
Table 1: Happy Income 2007 
Country Mean Median Std.  Dev.  Obs. 
Austria  9.03 8.54  4.93  572 
Belgium  8.61 7.77  5.69  735 
Bulgaria  2.08 1.42  2.46  729 
Cyprus  7.49 6.23  5.50  767 
Czech Republic  6.05 5.16  4.84  786 
Germany  9.29 7.58  6.57  1437 
Denmark  10.81 10.09 6.37 810 
Estonia  5.16 3.91  4.69  841 
Greece  6.47 5.45  4.79  726 
Spain  6.92 5.90  5.20  506 
Finland  10.77 9.87 6.17  802 
France  9.59 8.56  5.98  1170 
Hungary  3.68 2.87  3.68  742 
Ireland  9.48 7.58  7.60  474 
Italy  7.47 6.62  5.49  498 
Lithuania  4.12 2.97  4.25  871 
Luxembourg  17.01 15.96 8.54 566 
Latvia  4.31 2.94  4.77  716 
Malta  7.56 6.40  4.99  611 
Netherlands  13.02 11.57 7.24 805 
Poland  4.56 3.38  4.35  1063 
Portugal  4.52 3.07  4.74  419 
Romania  2.63 1.95  2.83  736 
Sweden  12.96 12.05 6.29 942 
Slovenia  6.93 5.74  5.12  712 
Slovakia  4.93 4.19  4.11  769 
United Kingdom  10.39 8.12 8.26  817 
EU 27  7.68 5.99  6.52  20622 
 
Source of data: EQLS 2007.   20
 
 
4  Comparison of Happy Income and Happy Life Years 
4.1 Theoretical concept of Happy Life Years (HLY) 
 
One of the first indicators to transform two-dimensional ordinal utility to a one-dimensional 
indicator was the Happy Life Years index. The concept of “Happy Life Years” (HLY) 
(Veenhoven, 2005b, 2002) was developed by Ruut Veenhoven (1996, 2005a)
14 and was the 
result of his search for an indicator of the well-being of nations (Veenhoven, 1996, 2002, 
2004, 2005a, 2005b). 
 
Employing the formalization applied here, the indicator of Happy Life Years can be expressed 
as  
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where L denotes the lifetime as the input and ψ  the psycho-social well-being. In a similar 
manner to Happy Income, the one-dimensional utility levels given by (13) have no upper 
ceiling a priori. The functional form is specified by Veenhoven as a multiplicative construct, 
i.e. life time and happiness are mutually utility independent and mutually necessary for well-
being: 
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where the lifetime utility is the expected lifetime 








) ( , ,           ( 1 5 )  
and psycho-social well-being is again the individually reported life satisfaction: 
 
). ,..., , , ( ) ( 3 2 1 n l l l l H U = ψ           ( 1 6 )  
                                                            
14 Alternative expressions are “Happiness adjusted life-years” (HALY) (Veenhoven, 2002), or “Happy Life-
Expectancy” (HLE) (Veenhoven, 1996).   21
 
For psycho-social well-being, the same holds as in the case of Happy Income. The 
measurement may be interpreted as the mapping H of a vector of objective psycho-social life 
circumstances  l1, l2, l3, …, j l , l n of an individual (where  j l  might be interpreted as the 
equivalent income) onto an integer number, Int = 1, … , 10: 
 
). , ,... , , ( ) , ,..., , , (
) 10 ,..., 1 ( ... :
3 2 1 3 2 1 n j n j l l l l l H l l l l l
INT R R R H
→
→ × × ×
+ + +
        ( 1 7 )  
 
 
As before, H(l1, l2, l3, …, ln) may be interpreted as a measure of psycho-social well-being. It is 
assumed that the level of life satisfaction reported by an individual, H(…), is the best 
available measure of psycho-social well-being. 
  
The Happy Life Years of a society j at time t can therefore be measured as: 
). (
1
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The theoretical foundation of the HLY index is quite similar to the HI index in (12). The main 
difference is that the HLY index uses life expectancy as a non-monetary utility component 
which is cardinally measurable, in addition to self-reported life satisfaction, in order to specify 
utility, whereas the HI index employs household equivalent incomes instead. Nevertheless, 
the interpretation of the indices is different. The HI index can be useful for determining the 
short-term economic and psycho-social conditions of life, whereas the HLY index provides a 
measure of the comparison of the life-satisfaction-weighted average life span. 
  
 
4.2 Empirical comparison 
 
The HLY and the HI of the twenty seven member states of the EU are compared. Both 
indicators are calculated using data from the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS); data 
on life expectancy is taken from the World Health Organization (WHO). The idea behind   22
HLY is to combine quality of life (self-reported happiness measured on a Likert-scale)
 15 with 
life expectancy at birth (measured in years), i.e. the time a person may be expected to enjoy 
life happiness. These dimensions are multiplied by one another (Veenhoven, 2004, 2005b), 
implying an equal weight for both the quality and quantity of life.
16 “Suppose that life 
expectancy in a country is 60 years, and that the average score on a 0 to 10-step happiness 
scale is 5. Converted to a 0 - 1 scale, the happiness score is then 0.5. The product of 60 and 
0.5 is 30. So the number of happy life-years is 30 in that country. If life-expectancy is also 60 
years but average happiness 8, the number of happy life-years is 48 (60 x 0.8).” (Veenhoven, 
2005b; similarly Veenhoven, 1996). 
 
The WHO collects data on health in its member countries. For the calculation of Happy Life 
Years, the life expectancy at birth for the year 2007 is used. These are the estimated average 
life years of a child born in the respective country in 2007.
17 Thus, we do not calculate the 
Happy Life Years with the original data for life expectancy of the respondents, but instead, 
with the counterfactual value of life expectancy for individuals born in 2007.  
 
Because the HLY are calculated as the product of the degree of happiness and the life span 
over which this happiness is experienced, the isolated components are average happiness 
scores (qualitative life component) and the average life expectancies (quantitative life 
component). Figure 6 presents the average life expectancy at birth (for both sexes jointly) in 
2007. In Figure A2 in the appendix, the countries’ HLY are depicted graphically.
18 For 
example, the Happy Life Years in 2007 are 60.36 in Luxembourg (LU), 57.86 in the United 
Kingdom (UK), 57.23 in France (FR) and 35.92 in Bulgaria (BG). 
                                                            
15 ”Happiness is a person’s overall evaluation of his/her life as-a-whole.” Veenhoven (1996) Therefore, 
happiness is understood as the evaluation of enduring satisfaction with life-as-a-whole (Veenhoven, 2004). – For 
a comprehensive discussion of happiness concepts, see McMahon (2006). 
16 While at the individual level, the happiness score has to be added on a year-by-year basis over the entire life-
time (Veenhoven, 2002), at the macro level, indicators averaged over the whole population for single years can 
be employed. 
17 As these values differ for women and men, the mean WHO value for both genders was used in the 
calculations. 
18 An alternative procedure would have been to use the data from Veenhoven’s World Data base on happiness, 
(see Veenhoven, 2009). Instead, the HLY were calculated with data from the EQLS and the WHO, so as to 
ensure comparability between the values for the HLY and the HI measure.   23





























































































































































































































Source of data: WHO (2009).   24























































































































































































































































Happy Income Happy Life Years
Source of data: EQLS 2007, WHO (2009), own calculations.   25
Figure 7 depicts, in one diagram, the values for Happy Income and Happy Life Years for the 
countries. As the countries are sorted according to their Happy Income index, the differences 
between the columns for the countries (with exception of the EU 27 average) indicate that 
there are differences in the rankings, according to the HLY and the HI index.  
 
Table 2 shows the values for both indicators for each country in 2007. The rank refers to the 
position of the country within the EU 27 countries according to the arithmetic mean 
signifying that the highest value is determined as rank one (and so on). The top three countries 
in the Happy Income ranking are Luxembourg (1
st), the Netherlands (2
nd) and Sweden (3
rd), in 
contrast to Sweden (1
st), Denmark (2
nd) and Finland (3
rd) according to the Happy Life Years 
ranking. 
 
The last column in Table 2 shows the absolute value of the differences in ranking according to 
the Happy Income and Happy Life Years indexes. The largest ranking difference occurs for 
Spain, which is ranked ninth according to Happy Life Years, but only sixteenth with respect 
to Happy Income. The last ranking according to Happy Incomes are Bulgaria (27
th), Romania 
(26
th) and Hungary (25
th), in contrast to Bulgaria (27
th), Hungary (26
th) and Latvia (25
th), 
according to Happy Life Years.  
 
In order to further analyze the relation between the Happy Income and Happy Life Years 
index, the correlations between the arithmetic mean of the aggregated measures per country 
are calculated. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.87 (p < 0.001), while the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient for the correlation of the two indicators is 0.94 (p < 0.001). 
Obviously, the rankings at the aggregate level are quite similar. In contrast, the correlations 
between Happy Life Years and Happy Income are still significant, but much weaker at the 
individual level. For individual observations, the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.56 (p < 
0.001) and the Spearman rank order coefficient 0.67 (p < 0.001). Thus, the relationship is 
more pronounced at the individual level than at the aggregate level. This may be due to a 
concentration effect (Welzel, 2003). Avoiding an ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950), one 
could say that there is a strong, but by no means perfect positive correlation between the two 
indicators.   26
Table 2: Happy Life Years and Happy Income  
  Happy Life Years  Happy Income 
Country Rank  Mean  Rank  Mean 
Rank-Diff. 
Austria  14  51.95 10 9.03  4 
Belgium  8  55.69 11 8.61  -3 
Bulgaria  27  29.92 27 2.08  0 
Cyprus  12  52.40 13 7.49  -1 
Czech  Republic  19  45.41 18 6.05  1 
Germany  13 52.07 9 9.29  4 
Denmark 2  63.07  4  10.81  -2 
Estonia  23  42.08 19 5.16  4 
Greece  17  47.12 17 6.47  0 
Spain  9  53.98 16 6.92  -7 
Finland 3  60.54  5  10.77  -2 
France  11 53.49 7 9.59  4 
Hungary  26  34.54 25 3.68  1 
Ireland  6  56.38 8 9.48  -2 
Italy  16  48.14 14 7.47  2 
Lithuania  24  37.52 24 4.12  0 
Luxembourg 5  59.53  1  17.01  4 
Latvia  25  36.92 23 4.31  2 
Malta  7  56.34 12 7.56  -5 
Netherlands 4  59.55  2  13.02  2 
Poland  18  45.70 21 4.56  -3 
Portugal  21  43.20 22 4.52  -1 
Romania  22  42.46 26 2.63  -4 
Sweden 1  64.56  3  12.96  -2 
Slovenia  15  51.21 15 6.93  0 
Slovakia  20  43.88 20 4.93  0 
United Kingdom  10  53.67  6  10.39  4 
EU27    49.78  7.68   
Source of data: EQLS 2007, WHO (2009), own calculations. Rank differences are positive 
where the ranking according to Happy Income is higher (better) than the ranking according to 
Happy Life Years.   27
The two indicators measure different aspects of human well-being and the rankings derived 
from the indicators are different. Due to the inclusion of relatively stable life expectancy, 
HLY is more of a long-term indicator. HLY may therefore, not be the comprehensive 
indicator required for the comparison of the well-being of nations on a year-by-year basis. 
The Happy Income index seems to be better suited for this purpose. 
 
 
5   Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, it is argued that the simple concept of Happy Income may be considered as a 
useful measure for comparing the well-being of nations in monetary terms. Instead of using 
more complicated transformations of income and other variables, an ordinal happiness scale is 
multiplied by a country’s mean equalised household net income. Firstly, this procedure allows 
for the comparison of well-being in a country over time, as the measure of self-reported 
happiness limited by an upper and lower bound is combined with an unlimited cardinal 
measure of income. Therefore, increases in well-being that are in principle unrestricted, can 
be captured by the indicator. Secondly, since the happiness scale is interpreted as a 
transformation of objective life circumstances into subjective feelings, the multiplication by 
mean income monetizes happiness at the level of the country’s wealth. This allows for inter-
country comparisons of well-being levels. 
 
The new HI indicator is compared with Veenhoven’s HLY indicator. Despite considerable 
correlations of HI and HLY in European countries, both indicators seem to be valuable 
measures of a country’s average well-being. An advantage of the HI may be that the reaction 
of income to an improvement in material life is faster than the adaptive processes in life 
expectancy. Another advantage could be that income can be derived from recent data, while 
the data on life expectancy refers to persons born not in the year in question, but in the past. 
Happy Income could therefore be a valuable indicator which complements the measurement 
of quality of life in nations, beyond other alternative indicators like Happy Life Years.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: General satisfaction with life  
Country  Mean Median  Std. Dev.   Obs. 
Austria  6.84 7.00 2.16 1043 
Belgium  7.51 8.00 1.74 1009 
Bulgaria  4.90 5.00 2.01 1001 
Cyprus  7.05 8.00 2.22 1002 
Czech Republic  6.52 7.00 2.12 1225 
Germany  7.09 8.00 2.29 2007 
Denmark  8.47 9.00 1.71 1003 
Estonia  6.65 7.00 1.95 1021 
Greece  6.51 7.00 2.07 1000 
Spain  7.23 7.00 1.76 1015 
Finland  8.17 8.00 1.36 1002 
France  7.25 8.00 1.72 1533 
Hungary  5.51 5.00 2.25 998 
Ireland  7.59 8.00 1.89 998 
Italy  6.48 7.00 1.82 1515 
Lithuania  6.20 6.00 2.12 1003 
Luxembourg  7.96 8.00 1.82 1003 
Latvia  6.03 6.00 2.15 1000 
Malta  7.54 8.00 1.97 992 
Netherlands  7.87 8.00 1.24 1011 
Poland  6.79 7.00 2.08 1492 
Portugal  6.12 6.00 2.00 998 
Romania  6.46 7.00 2.06 943 
Sweden  8.35 9.00 1.63 1017 
Slovenia  7.15 7.00 1.95 1034 
Slovakia  6.56 7.00 2.04 1127 
United Kingdom  7.27 8.00 2.04 1502 
EU 27  6.97 7.00 2.11 30494 
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Table A2: Equivalent household income in 1,000 € PPP 2007 
Country Mean  Median  Std.  Dev. Obs. 
Austria  1.30 1.20 0.54 572 
Belgium  1.12 1.01 0.63 735 
Bulgaria  0.39 0.30 0.33 746 
Cyprus  1.03 0.89 0.61 768 
Czech Republic  0.91 0.77 0.57 787 
Germany  1.27 1.14 0.69 1437 
Denmark  1.27 1.16 0.69 811 
Estonia  0.76 0.56 0.62 841 
Greece  0.97 0.85 0.59 726 
Spain  0.96 0.88 0.64 506 
Finland  1.29 1.18 0.68 802 
France  1.29 1.17 0.70 1173 
Hungary  0.64 0.54 0.49 742 
Ireland  1.21 0.97 0.85 475 
Italy  1.13 0.96 0.77 498 
Lithuania  0.62 0.48 0.53 872 
Luxembourg  2.11 1.95 0.91 567 
Latvia  0.67 0.47 0.60 717 
Malta  0.96 0.83 0.57 612 
Netherlands  1.63 1.49 0.81 805 
Poland  0.64 0.51 0.54 1065 
Portugal  0.73 0.54 0.64 419 
Romania  0.38 0.29 0.39 776 
Sweden  1.53 1.41 0.65 942 
Slovenia  0.95 0.84 0.58 713 
Slovakia  0.74 0.64 0.54 770 
United Kingdom  1.39 1.14 0.97 819 
EU 27  1.04 0.86 0.75 20696 
 
Source of data: EQLS 2007. 
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Source of data: EQLS 2007.   37












































































































































































































































Source of data: EQLS 2007.   38



































































































































































































































Source of data: EQLS 2007.   39


























































































































































































































Source of data: EQLS 2007, WHO (2009), own calculations. 